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Rational Choice and Rule-Following Behavior

Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Sonnemannstr. 9-11, D-60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, b.lahno{at}arcor.de

While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of deliberation. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximization principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking rules and coordination rules. It is argued that within RC no satisfying account of such rule-following behavior can be given. In particular it is impossible to determine suitable preference orderings such that coordinating may be understood as maximizing relative to these orderings. Still, once there is coordination, following a coordination rule may be perfectly consistent with the basic assumptions of RC. So there might be a more complex theory of action that incorporates RC as well as a satisfying theory of rule-guided behavior.

Key Words: rationality • rule-following behavior • coordination • maximization • preference

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Rationality and Society, Vol. 19, No. 4, 425-450 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463107083737


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This Article Abstract Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Lahno, B. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?