|
Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
|
RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND THE SENSE OF CONTROL
A CROSS-SOCIETAL STUDY
Nahoko Hayashi
Elinor Ostrom
James Walker
Toshio Yamagishi
Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their partner. We examine two bases for the expectation of a partner's cooperation in one-shot games: `general trust' and a `sense of control'. Further, we discuss why we expect general trust and a `sense of control'. Further, we discuss why we expect general trust and a sense of control to play different roles in societies, particularly in Japanese society and American society. Specifically, we test a general hypothesis that a sense of control plays a relatively more important role as a foundation for expectations in Japanese society and general trust plays the more important role in American society.
Key Words: trust • reciprocity • experimental • Prisoner's Dilemma
References
- Andreoni, J. 1995. `Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?'American Economic Review85: 891-904.
- Beard, T.R., R.O. Beil and Y. Mataga. 1997. `Cultural Determinants of Economic Success: Trust and Cooperation in the U.S. and Japan.' Working Paper, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
- Benedict, R. 1946. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Billig, M. and H. Tajfel. 1973. `Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behavior.'European Journal of Social Psychology3: 27-52.
- Carnevale, P.J. 1995. `Property, Culture, and Negotiation.' In Negotiation as a Social Process, eds R. Kramer and D.M. Messick, pp. 309-323. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Chan, D.K.-S., H.C. Triandis, P.J. Carnevale, A. Tam and M.H. Bond. 1994. `Comparing Negotiation Across Cultures: Effects of Collectivism, Relationship between Negotiators, and Concession Pattern on Negotiation Behavior.'Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
- Croson, R. 1998. `Theories of Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games.' Working Paper, Department of Operations and Information Management, University of Pennsylvania.
- Hayashi, C., T. Suzuki, G. Suzuki and M. Murakami. 1982. A Study of Japanese National Character, Volume 4. Tokyo: Idemitsushoten. [In Japanese with an English summary.]
- Hechter, M. and S. Kanazawa. 1993. `Group Solidarity and Social Order in Japan.'Journal of Theoretical Politics5: 455-493.[Abstract]
- Jin, N. and T. Yamagishi. 1997. `Group Heuristics in Social Dilemmas.'Japanese Journal of Social Psychology12: 190-198. [In Japanese with an English summary.]
- Jin, N., T. Yamagishi and T. Kiyonari. 1996. `Bilateral Dependency and the Minimal Group Paradigm.'Japanese Journal of Psychology67: 77-85. [In Japanese with an English summary.]
- Kahneman, D., P. Slovic and A. Tversky. 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Karp, D., N. Jin, T. Yamagishi and H. Shinotsuka. 1993. `Raising the Minimum in the Minimal Group Paradigm.'Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology32: 231-240.
- Kiyonari, T. 1997. Trust and Trustworthiness: A Comparison of Japanese and Americans. Master's Thesis, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. [In Japanese.]
- Kiyonari, T. and T. Yamagishi. 1997. Unpublished experiment on trust and illusion of control, Hokkaido University.
- Kollock, P. 1997. `Transforming Social Dilemmas: Group Identity and Cooperation.' In Modeling Rational and Moral Agents, ed. P. Danielson, pp. 186-210. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kuhlman, D.M., C. Camac and D. Cunha. 1986. `Individual Differences in Social Orientation.' In Experimental Studies of Social Dilemmas, eds H. Wilke, C. Rutte and D.M. Messick, pp. 151-176. Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang.
- Liebrand, W.B.G. 1984. `The Effect of Social Motives, Communication and Group Size on Behaviour in an N-person Multi-stage Mixed-motive Game.'European Journal of Social Psychology14: 239-264.
- Messick, D.M. and C.G. McClintock. 1968. `Motivational Bases of Choice in Experimental Games.'Journal of Experimental Social Psychology4: 1-25.
- Pruitt, D.G. and M.J. Kimmel. 1977. `Twenty Years of Experimental Gaming: Critique, Synthesis, and Suggestions for the Future.'Annual Review of Psychology28: 363-392.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
- Sato, M. and S. Helper. 1998. `Determinants of Trust in Supplier Relations: Evidence from the Automobile Industry in Japan and the United States.'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization34: 387-417.[CrossRef]
- Tajfel, H. 1970. `Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination.'Scientific American223: 96-102.[Web of Science][Medline]
[Order article via Infotrieve]
- Tajfel, H., M. Billig, R. Bundy and C. Flament. 1971. `Social Categorization in Intergroup Behavior.'European Journal of Social Psychology1: 149-178.
- Watabe, M., S. Terai, N. Hayashi and T. Yamagishi. 1996. `Cooperation in the One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Based on Expectations of Reciprocity.'Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology36: 183-196. [In Japanese with an English summary.]
- Yamagishi, M. and T. Yamagishi. 1989. `Trust, Commitment, and the Development of Network Structures.' Presented at the Workshop for the Beyond Bureaucracy Research Project, 18-21December, Hong Kong.
- Yamagishi, T. 1988. `The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan.'Social Psychology Quarterly51: 265-271.
- Yamagishi, T. 1992. `Group Size and the Provision of a Sanctioning System in a Social Dilemma.' In Social Dilemmas: Theoretical Issues and Research Findings, eds W.B.G. Liebrand, D.M. Messick and H.A.M. Wilke, pp. 267-287. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Yamagishi, T. and K.S. Cook. 1993. `Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas.'Social Psychology Quarterly56: 235-248.[CrossRef]
- Yamagishi, T. and K. Sato. 1986. `Motivational Bases of the Public Goods Problem.'Journal of Personality and Social Psychology50: 67-73.[CrossRef]
- Yamagishi, T. and M. Yamagishi. 1994. `Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan.'Motivation and Emotion18: 129-166.
Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 1,
27-46 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/104346399011001002
 CiteULike  Complore  Connotea  Del.icio.us  Digg  Reddit  Technorati  Twitter What's this?
This article has been cited by other articles:
|
|
|
|
 
T. Yamagishi and N. Mifune
Does Shared Group Membership Promote Altruism?: Fear, Greed, and Reputation
Rationality and Society,
February 1, 2008;
20(1):
5 - 30.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
T. Yamagishi, S. Terai, T. Kiyonari, N. Mifune, and S. Kanazawa
The Social Exchange Heuristic: Managing Errors in Social Exchange
Rationality and Society,
August 1, 2007;
19(3):
259 - 291.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B. Simpson
Social Identity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Rationality and Society,
November 1, 2006;
18(4):
443 - 470.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
R. K. Wilson and C. C. Eckel
Judging a Book by its Cover: Beauty and Expectations in the Trust Game
Political Research Quarterly,
June 1, 2006;
59(2):
189 - 202.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
T. Yamagishi, S. Kanazawa, R. Mashima, and S. Terai
Separating Trust from Cooperation in a Dynamic Relationship: Prisoner's Dilemma with Variable Dependence
Rationality and Society,
August 1, 2005;
17(3):
275 - 308.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
J. Goldberg, L. Markoczy, and G. L. Zahn
Symmetry and the Illusion of Control as Bases for Cooperative Behavior
Rationality and Society,
May 1, 2005;
17(2):
243 - 270.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
