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THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE OF SOLIDARITY AND INEQUALITY

Needy people prefer receiving help in interpersonal relationships or being supported by a collective solidarity system. However, all actors would also prefer not to help or not to contribute. The dilemma is sharpened if there exists inequality of need or helping capacity among the actors. Using a dynamic selectionist model the evolutionary development of a pool of strategies is simulated for different scenarios with varying proportions of `poor' and `rich' people. A special strategy called `Hypocritical Cooperation', which deviates itself (if not threatened by sanctions) but acts to compel others to conform to solidarity norms, turns out to be very efficient and robust.

Key Words: inequality • rational choice • social norms • solidarity

Rationality and Society, Vol. 9, No. 4, 449-467 (1997)
DOI: 10.1177/104346397009004004


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