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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TIANANMEN SQUARE

Daniel Sutter

The authors offer a rational choice explanation of the 1989 Chinese crackdown on peaceful, pro-democracy student protesters in Tiananmen Square. The explanation is based on strategic considerations within the larger context of conflict between the central and provincial governments. The central government's reaction to the student uprising provides information to the provinces regarding its subsequent willingness and ability to use force against a province. They analyze a game-theoretic model illustrating the argument and present evidence documenting the growing central-local rivalry in China. The authors also apply insights from the analysis to other transitions.

Key Words: China • economic reform • political reform

Rationality and Society, Vol. 8, No. 3, 325-342 (1996)
DOI: 10.1177/104346396008003005


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