This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by M., D. G. A. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

SOCIAL NORMS, INFLATION AND STABILIZATION

This study presents a socio-economic game of inflation and distributive conflict where inflation is derived from, and stabilization is implemented via, social norms. We apply the `Theory of Social Situations' (Greenberg 1990) to contrast rational choice outcomes predicted by Nash equilibrium vs those derived as social norms under our normative criteria (von Neumann-Morgenstern stability). We then analyze `heterodox' stabilization policies, which seek to address both the economic and sociological criteria for stabilization. Our conclusion is that social pacts constitute a viable normative approach to stabilization because they address the social conflict underlying chronic inflation in order to derive stabilizing norms.

Key Words: coalition-proof • conflict inflation • social norms • stabilization policy • theory of social situations

Rationality and Society, Vol. 8, No. 3, 277-294 (1996)
DOI: 10.1177/104346396008003003


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				E. Woerdman RATIONALITY AND STABILITY IN THE THEORY OF MOVES: THE CASE OF THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA Rationality and Society, February 1, 2000; 12(1): 67 - 86. [Abstract] [PDF]