Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Rationality and Society
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by HIRSHLEIFER, J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

The Affections and the Passions

Their Economic Logic

JACK HIRSHLEIFER

University of California, Los Angeles

Two types of emotions can be distinguished: the affections (stable patterns of malevolence or benevolence toward particular others) and the passions (action-dependent responses to friendly/unfriendly acts). Either type may serve to induce cooperation from a self-interested party, subject to several limitations. Shakespeare's King Lear is examined as an instance where benevolence fails to elicit cooperation. To meet the necessary condition for evolutionary survival in competition with rational self-interested players, the emotional party must benefit not only in "feel good" utility terms but in actual material payoff. SILVER RULE, as an instance of reactive passionate behavior related to the familiar TIT FOR TAT behavior, is shown to lose out in evolutionary competition against RATIONAL play unless the SILVER RULE player has a sufficiently high probability of being able to detect when his opponent is a selfish RATIONAL player.

Rationality and Society, Vol. 5, No. 2, 185-202 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463193005002004
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Rationality and SocietyHome page
K. Yamaguchi
Rationality of Tolerance: An Insight into the Parent-child Relationship
Rationality and Society, August 1, 2006; 18(3): 275 - 303.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Rationality and SocietyHome page
T. Wagner
RECIPROCITY AND EFFICIENCY
Rationality and Society, August 1, 1998; 10(3): 347 - 375.
[Abstract]

Home page
 Rationality and SocietyHome page
B. CORNELL
A Hypothesis Regarding the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination
Rationality and Society, January 1, 1995; 7(1): 4 - 30.
[Abstract]