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When `No' Means `Yes, But'

Why Some Poles Voted Against Enlargement But for EU Accession

School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Jacobs University Bremen, PO Box 750 561, 28725 Bremen, Germany, a.kemmerling{at}jacobs-university.de

In situations where an electoral boycott is feasible, both voters and party leaders sometimes exhibit apparently irrational behavior. We argue that in some cases this can be explained by a strategic rationale. To exemplify this claim we use an empirical puzzle: the Polish accession referendum only passed the turnout threshold because of people who voted `no'. This is puzzling, since these people could easily have stayed at home without hurting the collective interest of their group. Conventional wisdom argues that the `no'-campaign fought an uphill battle and made tactical errors. In addition, voters were supposedly not aware of their strategic situation. We argue that some of these people did not oppose enlargement, but the terms of the negotiation process between the EU and Poland. Microeconometric evidence depicts the common characteristics of these moderately Eurosceptic voters. Moreover, a stylized game-theoretic model shows that Eurosceptic party leaders have behaved in an optimal way that produced benefits for these voters. We deduce a mixed equilibrium which fits the politicians' behavior best.

Key Words: public opinion • referendum • political economy • voting behavior • political science

Rationality and Society, Vol. 20, No. 3, 283-309 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463108090134


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