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Rationality and Society
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Agent Behavior Between Maximization and Cooperation

Eva Ebenhöh

Institute of Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabrück, Germany, Eva.Ebenhoeh{at}usf.uos.de

Claudia Pahl-Wostl

Institute for Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabrück, Germany, pahl{at}usf.uos.de

Evidence from economic experiments often shows a pattern of individual choice behavior that can be classified into three categories. One category comprises maximizers, another cooperators, and the third comprises waverers with quickly changing behavior due to changing circumstances and recent experiences. In this article the focus lies on the third category consisting of subjects not decided for one extreme but waiting for indications from others' behavior to make their own choice. This group can be drawn into mutual cooperation or mutual defection. It is this meta-stable behavior resulting from social embeddedness that causes most social systems to be inherently unpredictable. Theories of utility maximization and its extensions with fairness or other-regarding behavior fail to explain this meta-stability, because they omit social embeddedness. In this article we present a model of agent behavior in one-sided and two-sided gift giving settings that includes this wavering behavior, drawing on the theory of Ostrom (2004).

Key Words: social dilemma • agent-based modeling • cooperation • trust • reciprocity

Rationality and Society, Vol. 20, No. 2, 227-252 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463108089546
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