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The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems

Indiana University

ELINOR OSTROM

Indiana University

JAMES M. WALKER

Indiana University

This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from a case study and a set of laboratory experiments demonstrate the applicability of this framework in designing and conducting empirical research on CPRs.

Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 3, 335-358 (1990)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463190002003005


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