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The Comparative Statics of Collective Action: A Pragmatic Approach to Games with Multiple Equilibria

Department of Politics, University of Virginia, lfm9b{at}virginia.edu

The prevailing approaches to collective action in the rational choice paradigm often lead to implausible conclusions and tend to lack predictive power. This article introduces a method to overcome these difficulties. The method is based on the notion of stability sets of pure-strategy equilibria, already familiar from the literature on equilibrium selection and with close counterparts in evolutionary game theory. With the help of some simple examples, the article shows how this method can turn many intuitive insights into operational, testable hypotheses about phenomena of collective action.

Key Words: collective action • common knowledge • games with multiple equilibria • stability sets

Rationality and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4, 423-452 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463105055466


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