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Sanctioning Costs and Norm Enforcement

An Experimental Test

Department of Sociology, 800 SWKT, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA christine_horne{at}byu.edu

Anna Cutlip

Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University

This article focuses on the relationship between the costs of norm enforcement and the extent to which such enforcement actually occurs. We predict that as costs increase, sanctioning of deviant behavior is less likely. In addition, however, costs have a positive effect on the strength of meta-norms that encourage sanctioning. These meta-norms, in turn, lead to more frequent enforcement. Hypotheses are tested using experimental methods and, for the most part, are supported.

Key Words: cohesion • meta-norms • norms • sanctioning • social control

Rationality and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3, 285-307 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014003002


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