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Rationality and Society
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Revealed Preference and External Reference

Keith Dowding

Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK k.m.dowding{at}lse.ac.uk

Amartya Sen claims that the standard axioms of rational choice theory are not subject to `internal consistency'. That is, in order to discover whether someone behaves inconsistently or irrationally one must look beyond the choice function to the actors' motivations. This is true. Intentional explanations require reference to the environment or context in which choice takes place. However, rather than being inconsistent with standard von Neumann-Morgernstern accounts of utility and with revealed preference analysis, as Sen maintains, such externalist arguments show the standard accounts are necessary for intentional explanation.

Key Words: Amartya Sen • externalism • rational choice • revealed preference • utility

Rationality and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3, 259-284 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014003001
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