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Rationality and Society, Vol. 14, No. 2, 192-228 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014002003

Covenants without Swords

Group Identity, Norms, and Communication in Social Dilemmas

Cristina Bicchieri

Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA cb36{at}andrew.cmu.edu

In one-shot social dilemma experiments, cooperation rates dramatically increase if subjects are allowed to communicate before making a choice. There are two possible explanations for this `communication effect'. One is that communication enhances group identity, the other is that communication elicits social norms. I discuss both views and argue in favor of a norm-based explanation.

Key Words: communication • cooperation • group identity • social dilemmas • social norms


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