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`What an Ugly Baby!'

Risk Dominance, Sympathy, and the Coordination of Meaning

Cornell University, Johnson Graduate School of Management, 371 Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA dfs12{at}cornell.edu

The understanding of coordination games has increased greatly over the last thirty years through advances in game theory and tests in experimental economics laboratories. A given utterance, of necessity, is a puzzle and creates a coordination game of meaning. The solution principles used in this game should be consistent with those found in all coordination games, and can explain certain elements of pragmatics: in particular, when a speaker can successfully employ irony, metaphor, humor, hints, indirectness, and implication.

Key Words: behavioral game theory • coordination games hints • irony • meaning • pragmatics • risk dominance • sympathy

Rationality and Society, Vol. 14, No. 1, 78-108 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014001004


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