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RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND THE SENSE OF CONTROLA CROSS-SOCIETAL STUDY
Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their partner. We examine two bases for the expectation of a partner's cooperation in one-shot games: `general trust' and a `sense of control'. Further, we discuss why we expect general trust and a `sense of control'. Further, we discuss why we expect general trust and a sense of control to play different roles in societies, particularly in Japanese society and American society. Specifically, we test a general hypothesis that a sense of control plays a relatively more important role as a foundation for expectations in Japanese society and general trust plays the more important role in American society.
Key Words: trust • reciprocity • experimental • Prisoner's Dilemma
Rationality and Society, Vol. 11, No. 1,
27-46 (1999) This article has been cited by other articles:
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