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Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem

University of Missouri—Kansas City

This article examines the relationship between the first- and second-order free-rider problems in collective sanction systems, with special emphasis on the relative robustness of cooperation in the first and second levels. The results indicate that second-order cooperation exhibits surprising robustness relative to first-order cooperation. The implication is that hypocrisy, though universally maligned, may play a crucial transitional role both in the emergence of collective action and in the continuity of collective action under adverse circumstances.

Rationality and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 78-100 (1989)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463189001001006


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